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Abstract 
As globalization extends its influence to the far corners of the world, rapid developments 
and changes are taking place economically, socially, and environmentally. Cultural differences 
between and within organizations have become significant during the past few years as politics 
and marketplaces expand globally to include multiple nationalities, beliefs, and value systems. 
Unfortunately, terrorism has also felt the effects of globalization as organizations such as Al-
Qaeda seek to expand their influence worldwide. Although a considerable amount of research 
has been conducted to identify key cultural factors that play major roles within organizations, 
simulation models that attempt to quantify cultural effects are few and far between. 
In this paper, a simulation model utilizing system dynamics principles was constructed in 
order to investigate the possible effects of multicultural factors within Al-Qaeda. The model was 
constructed based on Chamberlain’s system dynamics model (Chamberlain, 2007), and modified 
to include a sub-model containing cultural factors and effects. The time frame for the model was 
from 1990-2020, with the cultural factors taking effect in 2003. The results were analyzed to 
determine possible strategies for exploiting the existing cultural rifts within Al-Qaeda and among 
its recruiting base. It was concluded that cultural factors play a crucial role in Al-Qaeda’s 
terrorism efforts, and that the development of effective policies regarding the multicultural 
nature of terrorism conflicts will be a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism. 
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Introduction 
As globalization extends its influence to the far corners of the world, rapid developments 
and changes are taking place economically, socially, and environmentally. Organizations are key 
building blocks for society; businesses and governments are just two of the many types of 
organizations. Consequently, the study of organizations and how they react to both internal and 
external variables has significance. Economies and businesses are affected as multicultural teams 
become more common place and the marketplace spans national boundaries; peacekeeping 
missions and multinational coalitions require that governments interact and cooperate in order to 
succeed. 
Since organizations play such a key role in society, being able to predict the behavior of 
organizations is an invaluable asset. How will an organization react to the departure of a key 
leader? Will an organization grow given certain hiring criteria? How does decision making flow? 
Can the execution of orders be improved? These are just a few of the questions that have 
significance in an organization. Organizational simulation is a tool that allows the testing of 
theories and predictions, and can play a vital role in answering many of these questions. Through 
simulation, better planning can be realized and valuable knowledge gained. The existence of 
complex supply chains confirms the interdependence of many organizations today; 
organizational simulation can provide a tool for companies to identify risks in the chain and plan 
accordingly. 
The influence of globalization has also given rise to a host of problems. Terrorist 
organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, have become global players, recruiting members from across 
the globe. Their multinational and multicultural organizations have been operating constantly all 
over the world. Organizational simulation could be a useful tool for predicting terrorist behavior, 
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thereby providing valuable information to governments. Weaknesses could be identified and 
exploited, and risks mitigated. 
 
Objective 
A significant amount of research is currently being conducted in the area of 
organizational simulation (Chamberlain, 2007); however, the majority of the existing models do 
not take cultural factors into account. The continued research and development of effective 
organizational simulation tools and methods, particularly with respect to multi-cultural/multi-
national factors, is a vital asset to organizations all over the world. Although a considerable 
amount of research has been conducted in the sociological arena on the specific factors affecting 
multi-cultural organizations (Klein & McHugh, 2005), the majority of these observations have 
been qualitative; the challenge, then, is to create an effective model that combines and quantifies 
multi-cultural factors into a valid representation of reality (Salas,  Guthrie, Wilson-Donnelly, 
Priest, & Burke, 2005). The model should have the capability to function as a tool for predicting 
organizational behavior and the effects of a dynamic environment. 
In this study, a simulation model representing the organizational behaviors and 
interactions of the United States and Al-Qaeda is constructed, with an emphasis on the multi-
cultural and multi-national factors that may play a significant role. Through the simulation of this 
behavior, accomplished by drawing from the available research in the roles that cultural factors 
play within organizations, insights regarding possible countermeasures and disruption techniques 
are drawn from the data. The implications of this research would not be confined merely to anti-
terrorism tactics; any organization containing elements of differing cultures and nationalities 
may benefit. Additionally, areas for further study will be identified and brought to light. 
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Methods 
Several existing simulation techniques are applicable to organizational simulation; two 
are particularly relevant: agent based modeling and system dynamics modeling. Agent based 
modeling determines organizational behavior on a macro scale based on the individual behaviors 
of the members (Shaw & Pritchett, 2005); hence, the collective activities/behaviors of the group 
members determine the overall organization behavior. Each member (agent) of the organization 
is a distinct entity; this entity interacts with the other agents within an environment. The 
environmental factors affect the individual behaviors and interactions of the agents within the 
system; thus, organizational behavior is determined by individuals operating within a defined 
environment. 
System dynamics focuses on the relationships between entities in an organization and the 
informational feedback between individuals; the nature of these relationships defines the 
behavior of the organization. At its foundation, the system dynamics method of modeling is built 
on stocks and flows (Eggers & Brown, 2002). Stocks can represent resource locations, state 
variables, or other values that change over time, while flows represent the rate at which the 
values of the stocks change. If two stocks are interrelated (e.g. available recruits and current 
members), a number of key factors may determine the flow from one to the other. The behavior 
of the organization is thus determined by the relationships of the stocks, as well as the flows 
between them. 
Both of these modeling approaches have relevance to multi-cultural organizations; in this 
study, system dynamics was chosen as the modeling technique. System dynamics was chosen 
based on the conjecture that a high-level, holistic analysis of organizational behavior and 
interaction would be an accomplishable next step in analyzing multicultural effects. Hypotheses 
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regarding the possible impacts of these factors would be more easily tested in the absence of 
quantifiable cultural effects data. Sensitivity analysis and identification of significant factors 
would be beneficial in providing further knowledge with respect to specific cultural effects. With 
regards to future research, utilizing the system dynamics approach may provide assistance 
toward producing more quantifiable factors that could then be used as inputs for agent based 
models, or a combination of both techniques. 
 
Base Model 
In order to provide a basis for the integration of multicultural factors, an existing system 
dynamics model was investigated; Chamberlain’s system dynamics model representing the 
“competition” between United States anti-terrorist activities and Al-Qaeda’s organizational goals 
was selected. At the time of this study, Chamberlain’s model was the most specific application of 
system dynamics to terrorist organizational and operational activities; subsequently, it was 
concluded that this model would be the best choice for modification and incorporation of cultural 
factors (see Figure 1 for an overview of the model).  
As mentioned previously, systems dynamics is based on systems of stocks and flows; 
interactions between different stocks and flows create either reinforcing (designated with an “R” 
in Figure 1) loops or balancing (designated with a “B”) loops. Reinforcing loops demonstrate 
relationships that feed growth or decay of variables, while balancing loops attempt to achieve 
equilibrium.  These loops are built on fundamental relationships between variables in the model. 
In the diagram notation utilized by Chamberlain, inter-variable relationships with an “S” 
designate that if the variable at the tail end of the arrow increases/decreases, the variable at the 
head increases/decreases; the inverse is true of relationships designated with an “O”: as a 
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variable at the tail of the arrow increases/decreases, the variable at tail of the arrow 
decreases/increases. Though Chamberlain’s original model was constructed using Vensim, the 
model was reconstructed utilizing the AnyLogic simulation package. 
 
Figure 1: Sub-Model Interactions (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
Chamberlain’s model was made up of six separate sub-models, each representing 
different aspects of the struggle between the United States and Al-Qaeda. These sub-models 
interacted to represent the overall system behavior of both organizations. At the highest level of 
abstraction, the model represents the battle between conflicting ideologies: Al-Qaeda’s use of 
terrorism tactics to institute a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate, and the United States’ pursuit of 
democracy to establish safety and security in the global environment. Success of either ideology 
leads to reward and decreases the resources available to the competition, while losses lead to 
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escalation of activities to regain lost ground. The six sub-models and their activities are 
summarized below; for details, please consult “Systems Dynamics Model of Al-Qa’ida and 
United States ‘Competition’” by Todd Chamberlain (Chamberlain, 2007). 
 
United States Activities 
 
Figure 2: United States Activities Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
The United States Activities sub-model, shown in Figure 2, represents the actions taken 
by the United States to counter Al-Qaeda’s terroristic activities. The resources utilized for 
response activities are allocated from the United States Federal budget; in turn, the available 
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funds are then distributed over four separate categories. Three of the categories are implemented 
in order to prevent Al-Qaeda from conducting terroristic activities, and include: preventative 
measures, offensive measures, and defensive measures. Each of these measures has an effect on 
particular aspects of Al-Qaeda’s organizational operations. Preventative measures decrease Al-
Qaeda’s ability to recruit additional members from disenfranchised populations. Offensive 
measures mitigate Al-Qaeda’s ability to maintain operational capacity and to provide training to 
new recruits. Defensive measures decrease the execution of planned terrorist attacks. The fourth 
category receiving funds from the Federal budget is consequence management. These funds are 
utilized in the recovery phase after a terrorist attack in order to repair the resulting damage. 
 The number of successful terrorist incidents conducted by Al-Qaeda effects the 
satisfaction of the public with the government; this in turn affects the revenues the government 
employs in order to fund the four categories. 
 
Terrorist Ability to Recruit 
 
Figure 3: Terrorist Ability to Recruit Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 The Terrorist Ability to Recruit sub-model, given in Figure 3,  is the first of five 
representing Al-Qaeda’s organizational activities. Al-Qaeda relies primarily on the population of 
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disenfranchised individuals in order to fill its ranks with recruits. The actual rate of recruitment 
depends on the attractiveness of joining Al-Qaeda, and the number of recruitment contacts made 
by existing members. Preventative measures from the United States affect the growth of the 
disenchanted population, as well as the number of potential recruits who accept the offer to join 
Al-Qaeda. 
 
Terrorist Ability to Train 
 
Figure 4: Terrorist Ability to Train Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 Al-Qaeda’s ability to train new recruits, illustrated in Figure 4, is heavily dependent on 
the available funding and the accessibility of training camps. The maximum number of recruits 
accepted into training at any given time is dependent on the percentage of funds available for 
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training. Funding is maintained through contributions from donors sympathetic to Al-Qaeda’s 
cause; it decreases due to training expenses, as well as the effectiveness of the United States 
offensive measures in freezing terrorist assets. After an appropriate delay for the duration of 
training, graduates are added to the pool of terrorist available for attacks. One significant 
modification made to Chamberlain’s model was made regarding the accessibility of training 
camps. Chamberlain’s model assumes that recruits can only be accepted between 1993 and 
November 2001 (training camps were first available in 1993, and the training camps in 
Afghanistan were destroyed in November 2001). This assumption was modified so that Al-
Qaeda’s training capacity decreased 80% after November 2001, representing the increased 
difficulty of training due to the destruction of the Afghanistan training camps, but reflecting Al-
Qaeda’s continued ability to train recruits (albeit at a significantly decreased rate). In the interest 
of sensitivity analysis, an assumption of a 50% decreased was tested as well. Overall trends 
remained the same, although the number of terrorist deaths and captures increased in magnitude. 
Funding was slightly affected as more money was allocated to training.  
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Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity 
 
Figure 5: Terrorist Ability to Recruit Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 The third Al-Qaeda sub-model, shown above in Figure 5, depicts Al-Qaeda’s ability to 
sustain its numbers of trained terrorists. In addition to the members who completed training, the 
sub-model includes the addition of 300 terrorists from Al-Qaeda’s merger with the Egyptian 
Islamic Front in 1998 (Hoffman, 2003). Terrorists waiting to execute orders engage in attacks at 
a rate determined by the average number of terrorists required per incident, as well as the number 
of incidents initiated. After execution of an incident, terrorists return to a waiting status. Terrorist 
losses are sustained during the waiting period (detection via United States offensive measures), 
or during execution of an attack (capture due to United States offensive measures or through 
suicide). 
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Terrorist Ability Execute I 
 
Figure 6: Terrorist Ability to Execute I Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 The next Al-Qaeda sub-model, shown in Figure 6, captures the relationship between 
funding, total number of available terrorists, and number of initiated incidents. The number of 
incidents initiated depends on the amount of funding available, and the number of terrorists 
required for each incident; either factor may act as a constraint. Successful incidents increase 
contributions to Al-Qaeda from sympathetic donors. 
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Terrorist Ability to Execute II 
 
Figure 7: Terrorist Ability to Execute II Sub-Model Diagram (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 The final sub-model representing Al-Qaeda, shown in Figure 7, focuses on the execution 
of incidents. After incidents have been initiated and are in progress, success depends on the 
United States’ defensive measures. As the number of successful incidents increases, access to the 
United States is decreased as security increases; this affects the future success of incidents. 
Failed attacks represent a learning opportunity for Al-Qaeda, and its operational competency is 
increased as a result, leading to higher rates of success in the future. There is also an escalation 
factor, since successful incidents increase the desire for more incidents in the future. 
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Base Model Validation 
 Having determined the overall structure of the model through Chamberlain’s article in the 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the challenge lay in determining the 
mathematical relationships between the factors in the model as well the values for the data used 
in the model. Efforts to obtain Chamberlain’s values for model inputs were unsuccessful, so 
estimation based on background research and frequent trial and error adjustments to the model in 
order to match the results of Chamberlain’s original work. The simulation model was run for the 
period from 1990 to 2001 and the results are displayed in Figure 8 and compared with those from 
Chamberlains paper which are given in Figure 9. 
 In general, results for the number of successful terrorist incidents, number of failed 
terrorist incidents, terrorist deaths, and terrorist captures were remarkably similar to 
Chamberlain’s results (Figure 9). Number of incident deaths yielded by the model was also 
comparable to the number produced by Chamberlain’s, with the difference primarily being in the 
steepness of the exponential curve; the reconstructed model has over 1000 incident deaths by the 
250th week (year of 1994), while Chamberlain’s does not reach the same threshold until 1999. 
Though the ending magnitudes were very similar, long term trends may differ. These five 
benchmarks were of greater importance than the others due to the existence of actual data; 
Chamberlain compared his model results with historical data regarding the number of successful 
and unsuccessful terrorist incidents, as well as the number of terrorist who were captured or died 
during the course of a terrorist incident. Consequently, these results were very encouraging with 
regards to the validity of the recreated model.  
 The total number of terrorists and the funding available to Al-Qaeda represent the 
greatest departure from Chamberlain’s model. Though the ending number of terrorists was 
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reasonably close, the trend displayed by the chart is obviously much different. Due to the lack of 
information on the original model, the reconstructed model may be lacking a factor not 
mentioned in Chamberlain’s article. Nevertheless, the trend displayed by the recreated model 
appears to be valid; numbers remain low until the opening of training camps, when the number 
of terrorists spikes quickly until funding reserves are decreased, slowing the rate of acceptance. 
This would also explain the trends in terrorist funding, as revenue builds up to around $28 
million, and then falls quickly when the training camps become available. Chamberlain’s model 
reaches a peak of $70 million in 1998, and it was concluded that an additional source of income 
not mentioned in the article must have been present (the article indicated an average of $10 
million per year). Regardless of the magnitudes, the trends displayed by the results from the 
recreated model would seem to be reasonable considering the events occurring at different times 
during the simulation run, and fairly representative of reality. Additionally, no data was available 
with respect to the total number of terrorists and the available funding; consequently, deviation 
from Chamberlain’s model on these particular points in not as significant. 
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Figure 8: Validation Results 
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Figure 9: Chamberlain Model Results Compared to Actual, 1990-Sept 2001 (Source: Chamberlain, 2007) 
 
 Having concluded that the model was a good representation of Al-Qaeda’s organizational 
activities from a holistic, high level, a seventh sub-model was created in order to take 
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multicultural factors into account. These factors were then linked to relevant factors in the 
original model in order to determine the possible effects.  
 
Multicultural Effects Sub-Model 
 Ever since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has experienced great 
tactical successes in the fight against terrorism. Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were 
swift and met relatively soft resistance; Al-Qaeda suffered the loss of many leaders and 
members, as well as training camps and other resources. However, it is becoming clear that the 
fight against terrorism will not be resolved quickly as evidenced by the continued conflict in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; rather, it may continue indefinitely. Given the long term nature of the mission, 
it is possible that assigning too much attention to tactical victories may not be the most beneficial 
approach. A more effective method may be to focus on long term strategic goals. Given the clash 
of ideologies and cultures represented by the struggle between the United States and Al-Qaeda, 
determining the significance of multicultural factors may be crucial in developing an effective 
and appropriate strategy. 
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Figure 10: Multicultural Effects Sub-Model 
 
 The Multicultural Effects sub-model, Figure 10,  was built on an additional line of 
funding, not present in the original model; although an existing line of funding could have been 
used (preventative measures), it was decided that a new line (AllocCulturalStrat in Figure 10) 
would provide greater distinction for analyzing the effects of the multicultural factors. 
Additionally, two new flows were introduced and established a connection with the number of 
terrorists waiting for deployment: Infighting and Combat Training. Infighting decreases the 
number of terrorists waiting for deployment and affects the total number of terrorists; combat 
training represents the increased training capacity available to Al-Qaeda due to insurgencies and 
combat zones that have served as training grounds for new recruits. The Terrorist Ability to 
Recruit sub-model was modified to contain a flow (ImprovedLiving) that decreased the 
population of disenfranchised individuals; this balanced the original flow representing the 
growth of the disenfranchised population. 
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The assumed budget for allocation to cultural strategy (AllocCulturalStrat) was assumed 
to be $10 billion per year. These funds would be distributed through two separate channels 
representing the two main initiatives: an information campaign (AllocInfoCamp) and 
development campaign (AllocDev). 
 
Information Campaign 
 The information campaign would consist of four main factors: distribution of pro-United 
States information (ProUS), distribution of Anti-Al-Qaeda information (AntiAQ), accentuation 
of ideological differences (IdeologicalDiff), and deliberate misinformation (MisInform). The 
first two factors would be focused on the mass audience Al-Qaeda seeks to target; if information 
was presented in such a way that the atrocities committed by Al-Qaeda (civilian deaths, targeting 
of Shi’ite Muslims, etc.)were brought to light, and in a context in which such organizational 
behavior could not be admired, the achieved effect would be to decrease the attractiveness of 
joining Al-Qaeda (RecruitmentFraction, Terrorist Ability to Recruit sub-model), as well as 
diminish the monetary support provided by sympathetic donors (Contributions, from the 
Terrorist Ability to Train sub-model), which would in turn decrease funding, affecting Al-
Qaeda’s operating capacity and ability to execute incidents. Communicating such information 
may also lead to infighting within Al-Qaeda, polarizing the members as ideological and cultural 
differences regarding Al-Qaeda’s tactics emerge.  
Similarly, distributing more pro-United States information would also affect the 
attractiveness of joining Al-Qaeda and the number of funding contributions. If such information 
could be communicated in a culturally relevant manner, highlighting the positives of the United 
States involvement (aid, economic development, pursuit of equality, etc.), one of the core 
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ideological (and in many ways, cultural) disagreements that drive terrorism would be addressed: 
hatred of the United States and its policies. This measure would not convince the most radical 
elements of fundamentalist groups, but would serve to mitigate the grossest mischaracterizations 
(Byman, 2003). 
The third factor in the informational campaign would seek to highlight the existing 
cultural and ideological differences within Al-Qaeda. The most obvious example would be the 
decision to execute attacks targeting the Shi’ite Muslim sect, a polarizing and highly divisive 
action. There was significant outrage among Muslims at the idea that an Islamic organization 
would target its own people, once again highlighting the significance of Al-Qaeda’s existence as 
a multicultural organization (Gunaratna, 2005). As Al-Qaeda interfaces with an increasing 
number of extremist organizations, it is inevitable that ideological disagreements, cultural 
differences, and divergence in objectives will occur (Byrn, 2004 and Boukhars, 2006). It is 
absolutely crucial to exploit these existing differences; information highlighting these 
dissimilarities should be distributed, at the very least to compete with Al-Qaeda’s headlines. In 
this model, ideological and cultural differences (IdeologicalDiff in the Multicultural Effects sub-
model) affect a large number of other factors: the attractiveness of joining Al-Qaeda 
(RecruitmentFraction), contributions (Contributions), the rate at which existing terrorist groups 
assimilate into Al-Qaeda (ExpTerrRecRate), and infighting between existing members 
(Infighting). A notable side effect is the consequence of increased conflict: recruits are provided 
with an additional training ground. This is evidenced by the conspicuous presence of foreign 
fighters in Iraq particularly; it is alleged that the conflict in Iraq is being used as a training 
ground for members of terrorist organizations among other things. In this case, increasing 
awareness of ideological differences results in an increased rate of training for new Al-Qaeda 
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recruits (represented by the CombatTrain flow from the Recruits stock to the TerrInWaiting 
stock). 
The final factor regarding the information campaign is deliberate misinformation 
(MisInform). This factor was created specifically with regards to Al-Qaeda as a learning 
organization; attacks increase in effectiveness and lethality through information sharing between 
operatives and by experiments in attack operations (Hoffman, 2003). It has been suggested that 
targeting Al-Qaeda’s learning ability is an essential tactic for mitigating its successes (Jackson et 
al., 2005). One method of disrupting the feedback loop would be to intentionally spread false 
information regarding Al-Qaeda’s methods, introducing ambiguity into the learning process. 
Misinformation could cause ineffective methods to appear more attractive, belittle the effects of 
successful methods, and increase communication difficulties. If an existing cultural or 
ideological difference exists between Al-Qaeda and one of its strategic partners (Hezbollah, 
Hamas, etc.), misinformation would contribute to the possibility of miscommunication and 
conflict. In the model, these effects were represented by the factor MisInform, with Al-Qaeda’s 
operational competency (OperComp), infighting within Al-Qaeda (Infighting), and the rate of 
assimilation of existing terrorists (ExpTerrRecRate) all being affected negatively. 
 
Development Campaign 
 In many ways, the development campaign would simply be an extension of existing 
United States policies of foreign aid. It has been argued that long term anti-terrorism strategies 
must incorporate improvement to socioeconomic circumstances experienced by the 
disenfranchised population, the main resource of recruits for terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda (Wulf et al., 2003). Basic living conditions such as electrification, running water, 
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sanitation, and a host of other resources available to the developed world have yet to be 
implemented in third world countries. The majority of the disenfranchised population has 
employment that is insufficient to meet their needs, or is unemployed. Education, which is vital 
to development, is unavailable, unaffordable, or ineffective. These issues are generally 
approachable by direct investment. In the Multicultural Effects sub-model, we account for these 
development factors as either economic (EconDev) or improvements to living conditions 
(LivingCond). Economic development would seek to establish a vibrant business environment to 
provide employment, while living conditions would be improved by implementation of basic 
utilities and services. Disenfranchisement and poverty create a culture that breeds discontentment 
and encourages fundamentalism; consequently, efforts to improve quality of life may have a 
significant, positive effect in the struggle against terrorism.  
 The most direct effect of the development campaign would be to decrease the number of 
disenfranchised individuals at risk for recruitment into Al-Qaeda, both through decreasing the 
rate of the dissatisfaction (RateofDissat) as well as introducing a decline in the existing 
disenfranchised population by improving quality of life. Another significant effect would be in 
the form of increasing the effectiveness of the pro-United States information measure (ProUS); 
the development campaign would provide affirmation of this information, as it would be 
demonstrated to the population that the United States has a legitimate, positive effect on 
development. The effects of the traditional animosity toward Western culture would be mitigated 
to some extent. 
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Model Results and Analysis 
Having created a sub-model describing some key multicultural effects in the struggle 
between the United States and Al-Qaeda, the factors were integrated into Chamberlain’s 
architecture. Related factors in the recreated model were linked to the multicultural factors, and a 
simulation was designed to run for a twenty year period (1990-2020) to determine the effects of 
the multicultural factors (with the Multicultural Effects sub-model being activated in 2003). It is 
important to note that after 2001, the United States increased budget allocations to defensive and 
offensive measures; this was reflected in Chamberlain’s model, as well as the recreated model.. 
The first simulation run did not incorporate the Multicultural Effects sub-model; this was 
to establish a baseline with which to determine what effects, if any, cultural factors would have 
on the continuing “competition” between the United States and Al-Qaeda. The simulation run 
time was 1560 weeks (30 years from 1990-2020) in order to provide ample time for factors to 
take effect; multicultural strategies tend to have more of a long term effect, while tactical actions 
have a more immediate effect. 
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Figure 11: Model Results without Multicultural Effects 
 
 Results from the first simulation run (Figure 11) indicate a number of long term trends. 
Over 30 years, the number of terrorists reaches 20,000, with an indication of stable growth. 
Funding falls quickly as terrorist training camps are opened; after the initial surge in trainees, 
contributions stabilize with an overall trend of slow, steady growth. The number of successful 
terrorist attacks reaches 11 incidents and displays a growth trend, with a clear indication of a 
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decreased growth rate when the United States increased its allocations to offensive and defensive 
measures. As a direct result, the number of incident deaths demonstrates a similar trend, with 
around 7,000 casualties at the end of the simulation run. The number of terrorist deaths 
experiences a fairly stable trend of exponential growth due to its direct relation to the number of 
incidents attempted, ending at around 75; the number of terrorist captured, on the other hand, 
ends at around 4,000, with a clear increase in rates when defensive and offensive measures are 
increased by the United States. Failed incidents reach 18 by the end of the simulation run. 
 Having established a baseline for comparison, the simulation was run once again for 1560 
weeks, this time with the Multicultural Effects sub-model activating in 2003. The results (Figure 
12) indicate several interesting long term trends. The noticeable difference is in the total number 
of terrorists: when the multicultural factors are activated, there is a rapid modification to the 
trend. The total number of terrorists decreases, with rates leveling out until reaching 7,000 at the 
end of the simulation. This is a marked difference in comparison with the baseline model, which 
ended with 15,000 terrorists and a fairly stable trend, indicating a possible effect of ideological 
disagreements and infighting within the ranks of Al-Qaeda. 
Funding maintains a trend fairly similar to the baseline model, as does the number of 
successful attacks; however, the magnitude is significantly different. Only seven terrorist 
incidents are successful, as compared to 11 in the baseline. The role of misinformation could 
play a heavy role in reducing Al-Qaeda’s learning ability, and consequently impairing future 
attack attempts. Although the basic growth pattern appears the same, the magnitude is 
substantially reduced. The number of failed incidents remains similar to the baseline. 
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Figure 12: Model Results with Multicultural Effects 
 
 The number of terrorist deaths increases slightly from the baseline model (from 75 to just 
over 100), but the number of terrorists captured is noticeably altered from the baseline model 
(from 3,900 to 1,900). The growth trend is also markedly different. The decrease in terrorist 
deaths and captures is due to the decreasing number of total terrorists. The key statistic is the 
number of incidents deaths, which follow the trend of successful incidents. Total casualties from 
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incidents dropped from 7,000 to 5,500. This is a strong argument for the potential effects 
multicultural factors could have in the fight against terrorism. 
 It is important to note that during the simulation run, the number of potential recruits was 
never a bottleneck; there was always a large population of disenfranchised individuals. Hence, 
the effect of the development campaign was somewhat limited. It may be tempting to conclude 
that development should not be funded as heavily; however, this fails to take into account that 
development provides a very public affirmation of the informational campaign, and that the 
effectiveness of both policies would be much increased if implemented simultaneously. 
 
Additional Scenarios 
 In addition to the comparison between the baseline model and the multicultural effects 
model, several parameters were varied in order to provide insight for sensitivity analysis. A 
number of scenarios were arranged with the goal of testing multicultural effects in different 
situations. 
 The first scenario tested was one in which the distribution of the total cultural strategies 
budget (AllocCulturalStrat) between the information and development campaigns was varied. In 
the default multicultural effects sub-model, 90% of the cultural strategies budget was allocated to 
development, and the remaining 10% to the information campaign. The new scenario split the 
budget so that both campaigns received 50%. A second scenario reversed the default situation so 
that 10% went to the development campaign, and 90% went to the information campaign. The 
results can be seen in Figure 13. 
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conducting terrorist attacks. This assumption may lack a high level of validity, since Al-Qaeda 
would most likely stop recruiting when funds decrease below a certain level. 
 
Future Areas of Study 
 Several areas of future research regarding multicultural factors would be highly 
beneficial. Further sensitivity analysis regarding the amount of funding allocated to cultural 
measures would assist in determining acceptable cost/benefit ratios. Additionally, a multi-
disciplinary study of organizational behavior would be of great assistance in developing more 
accurate numerical estimations of the factors for modeling inputs, increasing the reliability of the 
model. Another avenue of exploration would be to develop an agent-based simulation model to 
combine with the systems dynamics model; this would potentially allow for greater levels of 
detail in simulating organizational behavior, and provide further insight for multicultural effects. 
 
Conclusion 
 In summary, all benchmarks were impacted by the Multicultural Effects sub-model, with 
the exception of the number of failed terrorist incidents. This highlights the potential advantages 
of the United States developing a long term strategy for exploiting the multicultural factors 
within Al-Qaeda. In order to succeed in combating terrorism, the United States must balance 
tactical operations with strategies that attack the heart of the Al-Qaeda and similar organizations 
(Muckian, 2006). 
 Al-Qaeda has experienced great success in the information war, and has been effectively 
utilizing disinformation and mischaracterizations regarding the United States to foment anti-
Western sentiment. An effective response is critical in order to stem the tide of opinion and 
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neutralize Al-Qaeda’s recruiting base (U.S. Department of State, 2007). Al-Qaeda has been the 
winner in the information war, and the United States must enact effective information policies to 
compete. Studies on the organizational weaknesses of Al-Qaeda must be continued, with 
emphasis on determining ideological rifts and methods of inciting internal dissension. Efforts to 
lift the disenfranchised population from poverty must continue, with funding being put to use for 
improved living conditions and economic development. These policies should supplement the 
information strategies to synergistically improve their effect. 
 Multicultural factors represent a key part of any international organization. Al-Qaeda, 
with members from all over the globe, represents such an organization. It is indisputable that 
these factors play a significant role, and the United States must adapt and develop its anti-
terrorism policies in order to effectively combat terrorism.   
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Appendix: 
 
Figure 16: Complete Model 
